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This is an ambitious work that tries to locate a structural 
parallelism between Nietzsche’s and Merleau-Ponty’s ontology. 
According to Frank Chouraqui’s phenomenological reading, both of 
the philosophers are seriously concerned with the question of truth 
and especially with explaining – instead of explaining away – the 
occurrence of errors. This task motivates them to develop a 
philosophy, significantly ontological, that prioritizes ambiguous 
relations over their absolute terms. 
First, both Nietzsche and Merleau-Ponty construe lived 
experience as where the inquiry starts instead of what it would 
eventually explain. A philosophy is bad if it explains experience with 
respect to causal links between objects, or with respect to acts of 
“positing” by the subject(s), because it presumes a break between 
self-identical terms (the mind and the world, for example) and then 
hopelessly attempts to retrieve a link (“transcendence”) between 
them, which has already been denied in the first place. A good 
philosophy, by contrast, prioritizes the relation (intentionality) and 
thus interprets the terms of the relation as derived through a process 
which Chouraqui calls “overdetermination”. For example, in 
overdetermination the resistance one encounters in experience is 
absolutized into a definite object, while the agency thus hindered is 
attributed to a subject as the substratum of the agency. 
______________ 
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This ontological move from the terms to the relation entails that 
“experience” has to be reinterpreted so that constructions of realism 
or idealism are disclosed and, like in Husserl, “bracketed”. According 
to Chouraqui, both Nietzsche and Merleau-Ponty assume there to be 
a pre-objective sense of experience, which gives rise to the 
subsequent constitution of the subject and the object (both as the 
“falsification” of the pre-objective experience). It is equally important, 
though, that this falsification is not just a contingent fallacy, but the 
fate of pre-objective experience. Chouraqui even claims that self-
falsification is the essence of pre-objective experience. 
But if this pre-objective experience necessarily falsifies itself, the 
question arises as to how anyone can disclose it and especially its 
dynamism of self-falsification. Here Chouraqui seems to provide an 
answer that relies on a reinterpretation of phenomenological 
reduction. Claiming that Husserl mistakes “pure phenomena” for the 
target of phenomenological reduction, hence gets trapped in the 
pitfall of intellectualism, Chouraqui construes Merleau-Ponty as 
targeting rather “phenomenality”, i.e. the way by which phenomena 
show themselves. The variation of perspective, which is operated in 
phenomenological reduction, discovers not some self-identical “core” 
that may show itself in multiple ways, but the formal (structural) aspect 
of that showing, which, according to Chouraqui, belongs to the “less-
than-determinate”. Phenomenality is less-than-determinate, because 
the possibilities of showing are not free-floating ones (as if they were 
carved out of a pre-existent logical space), but are inherently 
developed out of the process of showing. 
By conflating the essence of truth with this formal phenomenality, 
Chouraqui ensures that Being, i.e. the truth of beings, does not 
determine beings up to the last detail. Rather, Being only prescribes 
the way in which beings show themselves, i.e. as overdetermination of 
the less-than-determinate, while at the same time allows beings to 
develop in countless and ever new ways. 
This has further ontological implications. Chouraqui introduces 
Merleau-Ponty’s notion of “softer Being” (the flesh), emphasizing 
that Being is neither a completely actual totality nor a posited empty 
horizon, but the movement of sedimentation (the transformation 
from possibility to actuality) itself. Being, as an infinite process of 
sedimentation, thus necessitates a history. 
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The ontological prospect Chouraqui articulates is both less and 
more than traditional ontology. It is less, insofar as it does not claim 
any determinate particular truth, but only the fact that the essence of 
truth is about the less-than-determinate striving to determine (and 
eventually overdetermine) itself. It is more, insofar as it ventures to 
account for the occurrence of – and even the tendency to – untruth, 
which in traditional ontology is usually dismissed as contingent and 
chaotic. For Chouraqui, this is accomplished thanks to the 
characterization of Being as self-falsification. The philosophy that 
expresses all these, of course, is also an instance of 
overdetermination, and thus is subject to falsification as well. 
The advantage of Chouraqui’s ontology is obvious. Not only does 
it avoid the aporiae of dualism; it also accounts for experience with 
less premises. It is reflexive in that it can explain its own emergence 
without positing any ad hoc assumption. It can also easily account for 
philosophies that diverge from it – they involve more 
overdetermination without being aware thereof. 
More importantly, like all good ontologies, it incorporates 
ontological evil (exhibited as discrepancy, self-differentiation etc.) into 
Being – evil is neither the lack (absence) of Being, nor some positive 
component of Being, but attaches to the way by which Being 
becomes itself. Evil is eventually to be overcome; even before that, 
evil is not merely negative, but rather contributes actively to its being 
overcome. Overdetermination is distortion, but it is also a transitional 
stage. This dynamic view of ontology not only allows Chouraqui to 
recognize a deep link between Nietzsche and Merleau-Ponty; it 
actually puts him in the company of several great philosophers, 
significantly Aristotle, Hegel and Heidegger. 
But then a problem arises: why does this ontology Chouraqui 
observes specifically belong to Nietzsche and Merleau-Ponty, and not 
to anyone else? Of course, Chouraqui never makes such as strong 
claim; yet, when he tries to show the parallelism between the two 
philosophers, his strategy is often to contrast them to a third figure, 
which, in turn, is sometimes misinterpreted, or at least partially 
interpreted, for the sake of argument. 
For example, when he establishes the claim, shared by Nietzsche 
and Merleau-Ponty, that Being is self-falsification rather than the 
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background of it, Chouraqui seems to put Heidegger at the opposite 
and to interpret the latter’s “ontological difference” (between Being 
and beings) as an apparatus for singling out a fundamental ground of 
beings, i.e. Being. However, for Heidegger Being is never a 
transcendent ground, and in each case it has to be accessed through 
beings. The term “ground” [Grund] signifies for Heidegger not a basis 
or a space, but “reason”, or the way a certain being is. It is striking to 
see how properly Heidegger, thus understood, fits into Chouraqui's 
framework. 
The same applies to his implicit criticism of Husserl. By 
distinguishing phenomenality from pure phenomena (the latter 
defined as what is immediately given and is not yet distorted by 
judgments), Chouraqui seems to make Husserl dangerously close to 
representationalists like Locke, for whom pure phenomena is another 
name for sensation or sense-data. In fact, however, Husserl’s 
“phenomena” is precisely what Chouraqui calls “phenomenality”, i.e. 
the way in which beings show themselves. 
But if Chouraqui's ontology is actually in line with not only 
Nietzsche and Merleau-Ponty, but also Heidegger, Husserl and even 
Hegel (whose name appears rarely in the book but who has a 
“presence in absence” all over it), one may reasonably doubt whether, 
instead of being something so dear to Nietzsche and Merleau-Ponty, 
Chouraqui’s ontology is not just some “commonsense” that is shared 
by, say, continental philosophers undisturbed by Cartesian-
Bergsonism. Their subtler philosophies depend on this ontology, but 
arguably says something more than it. 
This “basicness” of the ontology Chouraqui proposes can also be 
seen from its implicit formalism. Prioritizing 1) the relation, 2) 
phenomenality and 3) Being as self-falsification, it only informs us 
about the “how” of becoming in very coarse terms, without saying 
anything about the “what”. If such an ontology cannot err, it is 
because it self-consciously avoids any circumstance under which it 
may err. 
It remains true nevertheless that articulating the “how”, while 
paying attention to the immanence of evil in Being, is the most 
important task of philosophy, especially in an age when forgetfulness 
reaches its extreme and overdetermination dominates almost every 
“worldview”. Chouraqui’s revival of Nietzsche and Merleau-Ponty’s 
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(and indeed many others’) “secret” ontology is thus invaluable. 
Articulating this classical theme in contemporary philosophical terms, 
he elegantly makes it intelligible for people nowadays, not to mention 
that he has a perfect sense of problematics when he proceeds. His 
philosophy is a ring on the chain of becoming insofar as it is a novel 
determination of the less-than-determinate. As Chouraqui himself 
admits, his project too shall be overcome, though he does not show 
how. 
I contend, however, that this overcoming happens not only 
horizontally (when a subsequent expression falsifies the current one), 
but also vertically (when a certain philosopher proceeds from a 
formal ontology to its more concrete determinations). Philosophy is 
hardly meaningful without some edifices, and systematic thinkers like 
Hegel have a point even if their systems are bound to fail eventually. 
Philosophers may become so unconfident in thinking, so 
overwhelmed by the invasion of the absolute, that they stick to empty 
ambiguity, establishing its legitimacy again and again, while they are 
no longer able to endure their own productive sickness (a system!), 
their own absolutes. The truth is not endangered, philosophers like 
Chouraqui ensure it; but things would be even better if their critical 
lucidity were paired with some architectonic innocence – sometimes 
it is just worth a try. 
 
